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PREFACE 
T h i s  paper  i s  one i n  a  series o f  r e p o r t s  on exper iments  
w i t h  a  game c o n c e r n i n g  c o s t  a l l o c a t i o n  i n  w a t e r  r e s o u r c e s .  
The u l t i m a t e  p u r p o s e  o f  t h e  game i s  t o  b e  an  a i d  i n  f i n d i n g  
b e t t e r  methods f o r  a l l o c a t i n g  j o i n t  c o s t s  i n  p r o j e c t s  when 
s e v e r a l  p a r t i e s ,  e . g . ,  m u n i c i p a l i t i e s ,  j o i n  t o g e t h e r  t o  s a v e  
c o s t s  by b u i l d i n g  a  l a r g e r  f a c i l i t y  i n s t e a d  o f  s e v e r a l  s m a l l e r  
ones .  
Gaming, i . e . ,  t h e  a c t u a l  p l a y i n g  o f  games, can  b e  s e e n  a s  
a  complement t o  o t h e r ,  more d e d u c t i v e ,  methods,  f o r  example, 
game t h e o r y .  S i n c e  t h e  i d e a  i s  t h a t  t h e  p l a n n e r s  i n v o l v e d  
s h a l l  r e a l l y  want t o  use  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  scheme, it i s  
i m p o r t a n t  t h a t  t h e  scheme is congruen t  w i t h  t h e  p l a n n e r ' s  own 
t h i n k i n g .  Gaming c a n  f i r s t  o f  a l l  be  s e e n  a s  a n  " a c i d  t e s t "  
o f  t h e  proposed game t h e o r e t i c  s u g g e s t i o n .  I f  some t h e o r y  i s  
n o t  a p p e a l i n g  i n  a n  e x p e r i m e n t a l  s e t t i n g ,  it i s  most l i k e l y  
n o t  s o  i n  r e a l  a p p l i c a t i o n  e i t h e r .  Fur the rmore ,  gaming can  be  
s e e n  a s  a  d i r e c t  way o f  f i n d i n g  o u t  what  i d e a s  o f  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
a r e  r e a l l y  n e l d  by p l a n n e r s :  How do i n t e l l i g e n t  d e c i s i o n  makers ,  
w i t h  a  r e a s o n a b l e  t i m e  f o r  t h i n k i n g  th rough  t h e  problem, a r r i v e  
a t  a  compromise between d i f f e r e n t  c o n c e p t s ,  such a s  e f f i c i e n c y  
and e q u i t y ,  i n  n e g o t i a t i o n s  o f  t h i s  t y p e ?  
ABSTRACT 
T h i s  p a p e r  r e v i e w s  t h r e e  gaming e x p e r i m e n t s  w i t h  a  game o n  
c o s t  a l l o c a t i o n  i n  w a t e r  r e s o u r c e s ,  c a r r i e d  o u t  w i t h  young 
s c i e n t i s t s  f rom e i g h t  c o u n t r i e s  a t  IIASA. The game i s  aimed 
a t  t e s t i n g  some d i f f e r e n t  methods  o f  c o s t  a l l o c a t i o n .  
I n  e a r l i e r  e x p e r i m e n t s  t h e  game had m a i n l y  b e e n  u s e d  t o  
tes t  t h e  p r e d i c t i v e  a b i l i t y  o f  t h e s e  methods.  I n  t h e  t h r e e  
e x p e r i m e n t s  r e p o r t e d  on  h e r e  t h e  emphas i s  was on  t e s t i n g  t h e  
n o r m a t i v e  r e l e v a n c e  o f  t h e s e  methods .  A l l  t h e  p l a y e r s  w e r e  
i n i t i a l l y  g i v e n  a n  o v e r v i e w - o f  t h e  methods .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  i n  
two o f  t h e g a m e s e a c h  o f  t h e  p l a y e r s  o b t a i n e d  a  " c o n s u l t a n t s  
r e p o r t "  o n  a  method f o r  which  h e  s h o u l d  a r g u e .  
The r e s u l t s d i d  n o t  a p p e a r  t o  b e  a f f e c t e d  by t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  
o f  t h i s  n o r m a t i v e  influence, e x c e p t  i n  o n e  r e s p e c t :  w h i l e  
i n  t h e  e a r l i e r  games t h e  s o l u t i o n  had n o t  been  i n  t h e  core, a  core 
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COST ALLOCATION I N  WATER RESOURCES-- 
THREE GAMING EXPERIMENTS WITH 
YOUNG SCIENTISTS AT IIASA 
INTRODUCTION 
IIASA working pape r s  WP-80-38 and WP-80-82 c o n t a i n  
d e s c r i p t i o n s  of  a  game on c o s t  a l l o c a t i o n  i n  w a t e r  management 
a s  w e l l  a s  a  r e p o r t  on t h e  a c t u a l  p l a y i n g  o f  t h i s  game; f i r s t  
i n  November 1979 w i t h  w a t e r  p l a n n e r s  i n  Sweden, and second ly  
i n  A p r i l  w i t h  r e g i o n a l  p l a n n e r s  i n  Tuscany,  I t a l y .  The 
r e a d e r  i s  recommended t o  r e a d  e i t h e r  one  o f  t h e s e  two working 
p a p e r s  p r i o r  t o  p roceed ing  t o  t h e  p r e s e n t  one.  
Fur the rmore ,  WP-80-134 r e p o r t s  on two gaming exper iments  
c a r r i e d  o u t  w i t h  Swedish d o c t o r a l  s t u d e n t s .  I t  i s  n o t  n e c e s s a r y  
t o  r e a d  t h i s  paper  b u t  some r e f e r e n c e s  w i l l  be made t o  t h e s e  
exper iments .  
Although t h e  focus  o f  t h e  IIASA gaming p r o j e c t  i s  t o  
i n v o lv e ,  a s  f a r  a s  p o s s i b l e ,  r e a l  d e c i s i o n  makers,  it i s  a l s o  
of  impor tance  t o  o b t a i n  many game r u n s  t o  be  a b l e  t o  s t u d y  t h e  
s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  game more g e n e r a l l y .  When an o p p o r t u n i t y  was 
g iven  t o  run  t h i s  wa t e r  game t h r e e  t i m e s  w i t h  s c i e n t i s t s  p a r t i -  
c i p a t i n g  i n  t h e  IIASA summer program f o r  young s c i e n t i s t s  t h e  
o p p o r t u n i t y  was, u t i l i z e d .  
I t  shou ld  be mentioned t h a t  one shou ld  n o t  t a k e  t h e  
c o n n o t a t i on  "young" t o o  l i t e r a l l y .  The v a s t  m a j o r i t y  of t h e s e  
s c i e n t i s t s  have been invo lved  i n  r e s e a r c h ,  a f t e r  t h e i r  pr imary 
d e g r e e ,  f o r  s e v e r a l  y e a r s .  Although m a t e r i a l  i s  l a c k i n g  f o r  
an e x a c t  comparison,  it i s  t h e  a u t h o r ' s  s t r o n g  impress ion  t h a t  
b o t h  a s  r e g a r d s  a g e ,  d e g r e e s  and numbers of  y e a r s  i n  r e s e a r c h  
o r  o t h e r  work t h e  IIASA young s c i e n t i s t s  g roup  i s  more advanced 
t h a n  t h e  group of  Swedish d o c t o r a l  s t u d e n t s  mentioned above. 
I t  shou ld  be added t h a t  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  t h e r e  appeared t o  be a  
considerably greater experience among the members of the IIASA 
young scientists program in quantitative methods. 
It should also be mentioned that two IIASA scientists, 
not belonging tothe young scientists program, also participated. 
We had planned for 3 game groups with 6 players in each group, 
i.e., a total of 18 players, but at the last moment, contrary 
to our expectations, two members of the young scientists group 
did not turn up for the game. In order to be able to still run 
the three experimental groups we, therefore, used these two 
IIASA scientists. 
THEORETICAL BACK-GROUND 
The main aim of the preceding experiments were to provide 
a test for some different methods of cost allocation presented 
in IIASA WP-79-77. These methods are presented also in the 
earlier mentioned WP-80-38 and WP-80-82, and also partly in 
appendix B below. 
Yere, we shall briefly mention that the methods can 
be characterized as: 
1. Simple proportional methods, such as allocating costs 
in proportion to population'and demand. 
2. A method used in practice, called the SCRB-method. 
3. A method based on a certain type of game theoretic 
reasoning, involving the step by step build up of larqer 
and larger coalitions, called the Shapley value. 
4. Three methods based on the game theoretic concept of the 
core. The core is the set of all solutions which fulfil 
the following three principles: 
1 ) Individual Rationality: 
No municipality shall pay a higher cost than it 
would have to pay, if it were to fulfill its 
water needs completely on its own. 
2) The "Full Cost" Principle: 
Total costs should be covered, leaving no surplus 
and no loss to any third party. 
3) "Group Rationality", refers to subcoalitions, i.e., 
coalitions smaller than the grand coalition and implies 
that the sum of payments made by the members of every 
such subcoalition should not be larger than the cost 
that this subcoalition incurs if it is working on its own. 
There are, however, a great many solutions in the core. 
One way to obtain a unique solution in the core is to assume 
that one gives subsidies to the various subcoalitions so that 
one obtains a unique core. 
I n  t h e  WP-79-70 t h r e e  schemes f o r  such  s u b s i d i e s  were 
d i s c u s s e d .  
1 .  Each c o a l i t i o n  o b t a i n s  t h e  same s u b s i d y .  The s o l u t i o n  
t h e n  o b t a i n e d  i s  c a l l e d  t h e  Nuc leo lus ,  o r  a s  i n  t h i s  
p a p e r '  t h e  O r d i n a r y  Nucleolus .  
2. Each c o a l i t i o n  o b t a i n s  a  s u b s i d y  i n  d i r e c t  p r o p o r t i o n  
t o  t h e  number o f  members i n  t h i s  c o a l i t i o n ,  i .e .  t h e  
s u b s i d y  o b t a i n e d  p e r  m e m b e r  i s  t h e  same f o r  e a c h  
c o a l i t i o n .  T h i s  method i s  c a l l e d  t h e  Weak L e a s t  Core,  
o r  a s  i n  t h i s  paper ,  t h e  Weak ~ u c l e o l u s '  .
3. Each c o a l i t i o n  o b t a i n s  a  s u b s i d y  t h a t  is  d i r e c t l y  pro-  
p o r t i o n a l  t o  i t s  c o s t s ,  i . e . ,  t h e  s u b s i d y  p e r c e n t a g e  
i s  t h e  same f o r  e a c h  c o a l i t i o n .  T h i s  method i s  c a l l e d  
t h e  P r o p o r t i o n a l  L e a s t  Core.  
The s u b s i d y  r a t e  i s  made j u s t  b i g  enough t o  make t h e  
s o l u t i o n  un ique .  
Choosing between t h e s e  t h r e e  methods, WP-79-70 f o c u s s e d  
on t h e  s o  c a l l e d  monoton ic i ty  p r i n c i p l e :  I f  c o s t s  g o  up,  no 
p a r t y  s h a l l  pay less and i f  c o s t s  go down, no p a r t y  s h a l l  pay 
more. 
S i n c e  t h e  Weak L e a s t  Core was t h e  o n l y  one o f  t h e  t h r e e  
c o r e  c o n c e p t s  which f u l f i l l e d  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  i n  a l l  games, t h i s  
was i n  WP-79-70 p r e f e r r e d  from a normat ive  p o i n t  o f  view. 
L a t e r  t h e o r e t i c a l  development  by P. Young h a s  i n v o l v e d  
a n o t h e r  c o r e  s o l u t i o n ,  which h e r e  s h a l l  be  c a l l e d  t h e  Pro- 
p o r t i o n a l  Nucleolus .  I t  i s  s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  method above c a l l e d  
t h e  P r o p o r t i o n a l  L e a s t  Core,  b u t  t h e  s u b s i d i e s  are now no 
l o n g e r  p r o p o r t i o n a l  t o  c o s t s ,  b u t  i n s t e a d  t o  c o s t  s a v i n g s .  
The s a v i n g s  a r e  c a l c u l a t e d  a s  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  c o s t  
of  t h e  c o a l i t i o n  and t h e  'sum o f  a l l  t h e  c o s t s  t h a t  t h e  members 
-. 
o f  t h e  c o a l i t i o n s  would have i n c u r r e d ,  i f  each  one o f  them had 
been c o m p l e t e l y  on h i s  own. 
' w e  have p r e f e r r e d  t o  u s e  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  names: Nuc leo lus  - 
O r d i n a r y  N u c l e o l u s , a n d ,  Weak L e a s t  Core - Weak Nuc leo lus  
r e s e r v i n g  t h e  f i r s t  name i n  t h e  p a i r  f o r  t h e  s o l u t i o n  i n  
WP-79-70 (as w e l l  a s  i n  WP-80-38 and W-80-82 etc . )  and t h e  
second p a i r  i n  t h e  name f o r  t h e  s o l u t i o n  p r e s e n t e d  i n  
RR-80-32. There  i s ,  due t o  a  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  t h e  computer  
a l g o r i t h m ,  a  s l i g h t  d i f f e r e n c e ,  a s  r e g a r d s  t h e  v a l u e s  f o r  
M and T. 
This Proportional Nucleolus has (according to P. Young, 
1980) the advantage of always fulfilling the monotonicity 
principle. It has, furthermore, an advantage over the Weak 
Least Core (Weak Nucleolus) in that it fulfills the following 
principle: 
A player who never contributes to any cost savings 
when joining with other parties or coalitions, shall 
not realize any cost savings above his go alone costs. 
-
Because of this, the Proportional Nucleolus is the 
principle suggested from a normative point of view in an IIASA 
Research Report (RR-80-32) published after the playing of this game.' 
THE EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
Different cost levels for test of monotonicity principle. 
The experimental design that we wanted to try out was in- 
fluenced by the outcome ofthe playing in the five earlier games. 
In all five games, the game theoretic concept that had 
been the least successful from a predictive point of view, was 
the concept which from a normative point of view in IIASA WP-79-77 
had been regarded to have the most desirable properties, namely 
the Weak Least Core. As mentioned above, of the game theoretic 
concepts discussed in the mentioned WP, this concept was the only 
core concept that fulfilled the monotonicity requirement in every 
game. 
The two earliest experiments in Sweden and in Italy had, 
however, in no way given the participants any reasons for re- 
flecting upon the monotonicity principle, since they had not 
had to think about the effect of total costs going up or down. 
In the game with the Swedish Doctoral Students we, there- 
fore, tested with one group the effect of focussing the attention 
of the participants explicitly on the monotonicity principle. 
This was done by introducing two levels of costs of the grand 
coalition, i.e., when all six municipalities join together: 
one of 83.82 mkr (millions of Swedish crowns); one of 87.82 mkr. 
The 83.82 figure is the one used in the previous experiments. 
The reason for putting the second level 4 mkr above, is that 
this is the figure used by Young et alia in WP-79-77. For this 
pair of figures, it is shown that the Nucleolus, which in the 
Swedish and Italian experiments was the most successful of the 
three studied core concepts, violated the monotonicity principle: 
When total costs are 83.82, party K pays 5.00; when costs increase 
to 87.82, K pays only 4.51. 
The players in this group got the instruction that the 
grand coalition must register two payment distributions, one 
when costs are 87.82 and the other when costs are 83.82 mkr. 
l Young, Okada and Hashimoto (1980) 
The play of this group indicated that the introduction 
of two specific cost levels did not matter in this case. . 
Obviously no conclusions can be drawn on the basis of only one 
play run; indeed a great many are required. Since the experi- 
ment with the doctoral students had been critized on the grounds 
that they had not been paid money in proportion to their cost 
savings, but a prize had been given to the best player, it was 
especially desirable to replicate the experiment with two cost 
levels, now paying all players in proportion to cost savings. 
Test of normative aspects of methods 
Due to the negative result of introducing different cost 
levels in the mentioned student experiments, it was, however, 
also found suitable to test more explicitly the normative value 
of certain of the methods. 
Such a normative test must, however, be carefully designed 
in order to have validity. In particular, it is important 
to avoid so called "authority effects". These might accrue, e.g. 
in situations when every player is supplied with the same 
suggestion for division of costs. If the game does not concern 
great amounts of money the players might follow this proposal, 
just in order to show that they have understood the proposal or 
in order to please the experimenter. A more reasonable approach 
to the normative testing of the model is to supply different 
players with different advice on how to make the division. 
Such advice could also involve specific arguments for the pro- 
posed cost division proposal. One can then possibly see, if 
the.arguments for one division procedure are "stronger" than 
those for others in the sense that the other players will abandon 
their division procedures in favor of this one. (Stahl 1980a). 
Hence we decided to set up an experiment, where in the 
game, each of the six players (municipalities) had a sheet of 
paper from a consultant with information regarding a method 
that he believes that the player should argue for. The player 
was to be quite free to use or disregard the arguments in this 
paper. Having six players we decided on supplying papers 
arguing for six different methods: 
We selected the demand method as the repre- 
sentative of the simple proportional methods, partly because this 
had fared better than the population proportional method in the 
earlier tests. 
The Shapley value and the SCRB - method were natural 
candidates being different and discussed in all earlier reports 
on the experiments. Of the four core methods discussed above, 
we left out the method above called the Proportional Weak Core 
(with subsidies proportional to cost) since the method above 
called the Proportional Nucleolus, (with subsidies proportional 
to cost.savings) was regarded as better, never violating the 
monotonicity principle. 
For these six methods the solution was computed on the 
basis of table 1 showing the costs of every possible coalition. 
Table 2 was then obtained. 











































T a b l e  2 :  ~ l l o c a t i o n s  i n  M i l l i o n s  o f  S w e d i s h  crowns 
S h a p l e y  V a l u e  2 0 . 0 1  1 0 . 7 1  6 . 6 1  1 0 . 3 7  1 6 . 9 4  1 9 . 1 8  
O r d i n a r y  Nucleo lus  2 0 . 3 5  1 2 . 0 6  5 . 0 0  8 . 6 1  1 8 . 3 2  1 9 . 4 9  
P r o p o r t i o n a l  N u c l e o l u s  2 0 . 3 6  1 2 . 4 6  3 . 5 2  8 . 6 7  1 8 . 8 2  1 9 . 9 9  
Weak N u c l e o l u s  2 0 . 0 3  1 2 . 5 2  3 .34  9 . 0 7  1 8 . 5 4  1 9 . 7 1  
S.C.R.B. 1 9 . 5 4  1 3 . 2 8  5 . 6 2  1 0 . 9 0  16..:.66 1 7 . 8 2  
Demand P r o p o r t i o n a l  1 3 . 3 3  1 6 . 3 2  7 . 4 3  7 . 0 0  2 9 . 0 4  1 0 . 6 9  
From tahle 2 we see that the shawley value is party 14's best 
method, the Proportional Nucleolus K's best and the SCRB's 
M's best method. Hence we assign these methods to thsse 
players. For the remaining players the Demand Proportional 
method is the best method. The relative advantage of this 
method, compared to the second best, is highest as regards 
T. For party L the Ordinary Nucleolus, not assiqned to any 
other player, 'is the second best method. Finally, for A, SCRB 
is the second best method. Since this is already assigned as is 
the Shapley Value, while the Weak Nucleolus is unassigned, we 
assign the Weak Nucleolus to A. Hence we obtain the following 
scheme of allocation of methods to the players. 
A : Weak Nucleolus 
H : Shapley Value 
K : Proportional Nucleolus 
L : Ordinary Nucleolus 
M : SCRB 
T : Demand Proportional Method 
~aving assigned each method to one of the players we 
proceeded to write a "consultant's paper" on each of these 
six methods. It appeared suitable to limit the length of each 
paper to one page. It did not seem reasonable to glve each 
method the same length of presentation; e.g., the Demand Pro- 
portional method requires little further specification, while 
for each core method we need to explain both the core concept 
and the specific subsidy scheme of the particular core method. 
The six "consultant's reports" are presented in Appendix B. 
Test of effect of prize structure 
AS mentioned briefly above, the experiments carried out 
on the doctoral students had been criticized on the ground 
that we had not given money to every player in proportion to 
his cost savings in the game, but instead given a prize only 
to that player who by some less precise standard could be re- 
garded as the best player1. The gist of the critique was that 
if some players believed they were not doing so very well, and 
hence had a smaller chance of being the winner they would 
lose interest completely and then play in a somewhat less 
serious fashion. 
We therefore, wanted a design in which the difference 
between two groups as regards the experimental design would 
only concern the prize structure. 
 he "prize will be given to that player who according to the 
judgement of the game leader acts as the most skillful 
representative for his municipality" among the players taking 
part in the game. 
Experimental set up 
In order to incorporate the three factors discussed above, 
we set up an experimental design of the following type for the 
three groups. (Table 3 . ) 
Provided one, of course, made a great many experimental 
runs for each of these groups one should be able to ascribe a 
possible difference in behavior to whether the players got a 
"consultant's report" or had two cost levels or to the differences 
in prize structure. Making at this time only one run for each 
group, one obviously has to be very careful about one's conclusions. 
THE PLAYING OF THE GAME 
Prior to the actual playing of the game the participants 
in the game were given a lecture of approximately one hour's 
duration about the game's background and the six methods discussed 
above. The idea was that everyone would in principle have some 
general familiarity with all the six methods, but would possibly 
have more detailed knowledge about only one of the methods 
























Prize only to 
winner 
A f t e r  t h e  l e c t u r e ,  t h e  t h r e e  g roups  o f  p l a y e r s  were s e a t e d  
around s e p a r a t e  t a b l e s  l o c a t e d  i n  t h e  same room, b u t  some meters 
a p a r t .  There  appeared  t o  b e  l i t t l e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  e i t h e r  group 
o b s e r v i n g  what t h e  o t h e r  group d i d ,  b u t  it w a s  p o s s i b l e  f o r  t h e  
game l e a d e r  t o  be  i n  c o n t a c t  w i t h  a l l  g roups .  
The s e a t i n g  around each  t a b l e  w a s  i n t e n t i o n a l l y  k e p t  as 
c l o s e  as p o s s i b l e  t o  t h a t  i n  t h e  ear l ier  games.'  
The p a r t i c i p a n t s  w e r e  a l l o t t e d ,  by random c h o i c e ,  t o  a 
s p e c i f i c  g roup  and a s p e c i f i c  m u n i c i p a l i t y  r o l e .  2 
Next t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  o b t a i n e d  t h e  gaming i n s t r u c t i o n s  
p r e s e n t e d  i n  appendix  A.  W e  have i n d i c a t e d ,  by t h e  u s e  o f  
s q u a r e  b r a c k e t s  and f i g u r e s ,  which p a r t s  w e r e  a v a i l a b l e  t o  
d i f f e r e n t  g roups .  
There  w a s  t i m e  f o r  q u e s t i o n s ,  b u t  t h e r e  w e r e  no 
q u e s t i o n s  t h a t  c o u l d  n o t  be g i v e n  an  answer by d i r e c t l y  re- 
f e r r i n g  t o  t h e  gaming i n s t r u c t i o n s .  
A s  r e g a r d s  t h e  p l a y i n g  of  t h e  game, w e  s h a l l  r e p o r t  on 
e a c h  group s e p a r a t e l y .  
Group 1  
Group 1  p layed  f o r  money p r i z e s  i n  d i r e c t  p r o p o r t i o n  t o  
c o s t  s a v i n g s  and e a c h  p l a y e r  had a s p e c i a l  " c o n s u l t a n t ' s  
r e p o r t "  a r g u i n g  f o r  one  method o f  c o s t  a l l o c a t i o n .  
H and L s t a r t e d  immedia te ly  t o  t r y  t o  form a c o a l i t i o n  
p o i n t i n g a t  t h e  h i g h  c o s t  s a v i n g s  t o  b e  made h e r e ,  32.96 - 
25.00 = 7.96. H wanted t o  s p l i t  t h e s e  s a v i n g s  e v e n l y ,  b u t  L 
i n s i s t e d  on s p l i t t i n g  t h e  c o s t s  more i n  p r o p o r t i o n  t o  demand, 
which f a v o r s  L. While H and L b a r g a i n e d  w i t h  e a c h  o t h e r ,  K 
argued  f o r  a t h r e e  p a r t y  c o a l i t i o n  HKL. 
 h he same m u n i c i p a l i t i e s  sa t  n e x t  t o  e a c h  o t h e r  as i n  t h e  
ear l i e r  games, b u t  due  t o  t h e  s i z e  o f  t h e  t a b l e s  two o f  t h e  
m u n i c i p a l i t i e s  were seat@?- a t  t k e  en?. of t h e  faS3.e i n  
c o n t r a s t  t o  ear l i e r  games. 
2 ~ n  e x c e p t i o n  t o  t h e  random a l l o t m e n t  w a s  made f o r  o n e  o f  t h e  
two IIASA s c i e n t i s t s  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  (see p . 2 ) .  Being v e r y  w e l l  
v e r s e d  i n  game t h e o r y ,  he  w a s  a s s i g n e d  t o  r o l e  H i n  g r o u p  1 ,  
s i n c e  r o l e  H ( t o g e t h e r  w i t h  r o l e  K )  can b e  r e g a r d e d  a s  t h e  
most i n t e r e s t i n g  from a game t h e o r e t i c a l  p o i n t  o f  view. A s  
d i s c u s s e d  l a t e r  t h e  outcome as w e l l  as t h e  b a r g a i n i n g  pro-  
c e d u r e  i n  g roup  1  d i d  =, d i v e r g e  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  from 
t h a t  o f  t h e  o t h e r  g roups .  
B e f o r e  t h e s e  t h r e e  p a r t i e s  c o u l d  a g r e e  on  a c o a l i t i o n ,  
M and  T, a f t e r  20 m i n u t e s  ( c o u n t e d  f rom t h e  s t a r t  o f  t h e  a c t u a l  
game) ,  formed a  c o a l i t i o n  w i t h  a d i v i s i o n  19.41 t o  M and  20.00 
t o  T. T h i s  i n v o l v e s  a s p l i t  o f  s a v i n g s ,  which  i s  more f a v o r -  
a b l e  t o  T  t h a n  b a s i n g  t h e  c o s t  s p l i t  o n  t h e  o n e  p a r t y  c o a l i t i o n  
c o s t s  o r  t h a n  s p l i t t i n g  it e v e n l y .  Then a f t e r  23 m i n u t e s  H I  K 
and L  formed a  t h r e e  p a r t y  c o a l i t i o n .  H and L  f i r s t  g a v e  K 
c o s t  s a v i n g s  o f  4  and t h e n  s p l i t  t h e  r e m a i n i n g  s a v i n g s  approx-  
i m a t e l y  50:50. T h i s  l e d  t o  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n :  H: 1 0 . 7 8 ,  
K :  6 .90 ,  and  L: 9 .58 .  
The n e g o t i a t i o n  t h e n  p r o c e e d e d ,  f o c u s s i n g  on  fo rming  t h e  
g r a n d  c o a l i t i o n .  I t  was t h e n  g e n e r a l l y  u n d e r s t o o d  t h a t  a 
t empora ry  c o a l i t i o n  was formed by HKLMT, b u t  t h i s  c o a l i t i o n  
was n o t  r e g i s t e r e d ,  as t h e  s a v i n g s  i n v o l v e d  a p p e a r e d  too s m a l l .  
The main p rob lem i n  t h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  t h e  g r a n d  c o a l i t i o n  w a s  
how much A s h o u l d  g e t .  A h e r e  wanted  t o  r e g a r d  t h e  b a r g a i n i n g  
a s  a  two-pa r ty  game, s t r e s s i n g  t h a t  h e  was t h e  o n l y  s i n g l e  
p l a y e r  a b l e  t o  b l o c k  t h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  t h e  g r a n d  c o a l i t i o n ,  
t h u s  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  o t h e r  p a r t i e s  a s  commit ted  t o  a f i v e  p a r t y  
c o a l i t i o n .  
A f t e r  l o n g  n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  a n  ag reemen t  was r e a c h e d  ( a f t e r  
79 m i n u t e s  c o u n t e d  f rom t h e  s t a r t )  on t h e  f o l l o w i n g  d i s t r i b u t i o n :  
T h i s  d i s t r i b u t i o n  i m p l i e d  t h a t  A o b t a i n e d  a  cost  s a v i n g  o f  3 .3 ,  
w h i l e  HKLMT t o g e t h e r  o b t a i n e d  a  t o t a l  cost  s a v i n g  o f  1 . 5 ,  
compared t o  t h e  c o s t s  e a r l i e r  r e g i s t e r e d ,  d i s t r i b u t e d  i n  p i e c e s  
o f  0 .2  - 0.4 t o  t h e  f i v e  p a r t i e s .  
The g r a n d  c o a l i t i o n  t h e n  remained  s t a b l e  f o r  15 m i n u t e s  
and  came i n t o  f o r c e .  
I n  Group 2  o n l y  t h e  "winne r "  would g e t  a  p r i z e .  
Everyone  g o t  a  " c o n s u l t a n t ' s  r e p o r t " .  
HKL h e r e  i m m e d i a t e l y  se t  o u t  t o  t r y  t o  fo rm a  c o a l i t i o n  
and a f t e r  26 m i n u t e s  f rom t h e  s t a r t  an  a g r e e m e n t  was r e a c h e d  
on H: 10 .61 ;  K :  6.78 a n d  L: 9.87 .  T h i s  i m p l i e s  a  d i v i s i o n  
where  t h e  s a v i n g s o v e r  t h e  c o s t s  when p a r t i e s  g o  a l o n e  were 
d i s t r i b u t e d  r o u g h l y  i n  p r o p o r t i o n  t o  t h e s e  g o  a l o n e  c o s t s .  
A t  33 m i n u t e s  f rom t h e  s t a r t ,  M and  T  a g r e e d  on  a c o a l i t i o n  
w i t h  M: 18.76  and  T: 20.65.  T h i s  d i v i s i o n  w a s  d e t e r m i n e d  on 
more a d  hoc g r o u n d s .  
A t  46 m i n u t e s  f rom t h e  s t a r t  t h e  f i v e  p a r t y  c o a l i t i o n  
HKLMT was formed w i t h  H:  10.57;  K :  6.75;  L: 9 .83 ;  M: 18.71  
and T: 20.61. The s l i g h t  s a v i n g s  o v e r  t h e  c o a l i t i o n s  HKL and  
MT were s p r e a d  o u t  e v e n l y .  
F i n a l l y  a f t e r  59 m i n u t e s  f r c n  t h e  s t a r t  t h e  g r a n d  c o a l i t i o n  
was formed w i t h  A:  21.02;  H: 9.85;  K :  6 . 2 9 ;  I,: 9.15;  
M :  17.83 and T: 19.68. The r e l e v a n t  s a v i n g s  were t h e n  regarded  
t o  be t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  c o s t  of t h e  f i v e  p a r t y  c o a l i t i o n  
and t h e  sum o f  t h e  c o s t s  o f  e a c h  p a r t y  go ing  a l o n e .  These s a v i n g s  
of  4.59 were t h e n  d i s t r i b u t e d  i n  accordance  w i t h  t h e  s h a r e  t h a t  t h e  
go a l o n e  c o s t  of  t h e  p a r t y  c o n s t i t u t e d  o f  t h e  sum o f  a l l  go a l o n e  
c o s t s .  I n  t h i s  s t e p  t h e  p a r t i e s  t h u s  d i d  n o t  t a k e  i n t o  c o n s i d e r -  
a t i o n  t h e  payments t h a t  had been o b t a i n e d  i n  t h e  ea r l i e r  s t e p s .  
P a r t y  A l o s t  most by t h i s  p rocedure .  T h i s  e x p l a i n s  why A i n  t h i s  
g roup  p a i d  more t h a n  i n  o t h e r  games. (See t a b l e  4 on p .  12. ) 
T h i s  g r a n d  c o a l i t i o n  t h e n  remained t o  come i n t o  f o r c e .  
Group 3  
I n  t h i s  g roup  t h e  p a r t i e s  were t o  o b t a i n  money p r i z e s  
p r o p o r t i o n a l  t o  s a v i n g s .  There  w e r e  no c o n s u l t a n t ' s  r e p o r t s ,  
b u t  i n s t e a d  two p o s s i b l e  l e v e l s  of  costs f o r  t h e  g rand  c o a l i t i o n .  
A f t e r  7  minu tes  H ,  K and L formed a  c o a l i t i o n  w i t h  11.54 
t o  H ;  5.37 t o  K and 10.34 t o  L. Here t h e  t o t a l  s a v i n g s  o f  16.61 
were d i s t r i b u t e d  i n  t h r e e  even p a r t s .  T h i s  i s  o b v i o u s l y  more 
f a v o r a b l e  f o r  K t h a n  d i s t r i b u t i n g  c o s t  s a v i n g s  i n  p r o p o r t i o n  t o  
t h e  go  a l o n e  c o s t s  and t h i s  e x p l a i n s  why m u n i c i p a l i t y  K was 
r e l a t i v e l y  b e t t e r  o f f  i n  t h i s  game t h a n  i n  o t h e r  games (see 
t a b l e  4 )  . 
Next a f t e r  22 minu tes  from t h e  s t a r t  M and T formed a  
c o a l i t i o n  w i t h  19.12 t o  M; 20.29 t o  T. T h i s  i m p l i e d  t h a t  c o s t  
s a v i n g s  were s p l i t  e v e n l y .  
A f t e r  t h i s  t h e  g rand  c o a l i t i o n  was c o n s i d e r e d ,  w i t h  A 
d r i v i n g  ha rd  t o  g e t  i n t o  a  c o a l i t i o n .  
A temporary ,  b u t  n o t  r e g i s t e r e d  c o a l i t i o n  HKLMT w a s  however 
formed,  implying t h a t  t h e  small s a v i n g s  o f  0.2 compared t o  HKL 
and MT a r e  s p r e a d  o u t  e v e n l y  (0.04 t o  e a c h ) .  
Then a f t e r  l o n g  d i s c u s s i o n s ,  77 minu tes  a f t e r  t h e  s t a r t ,  t h e  
g rand  c o a l i t i o n  was formed. The p a r t i e s  f i r s t  r e a c h e d  an  agree -  
ment on  t h e  h i g h e r  cost l eve l  o f  87.82. Here t h e  s a v i n g s  o f  0.6 
(0 .59)  w e r e  d i s t r i b u t e d  e v e n l y ,  each  g e t t i n g  a  r e d u c t i o n  o f  0 .1 ;  
F w i t h  r e f e r e n c e  t o  h i s  go a l o n e  c o s t s  and t h e  o t h e r  w i t h  r e f e r -  
e n c e  t o  t h e  temporary  c o a l i t i o n  HKLMT. Then a s  r e g a r d s  t h e  lower 
cost  l e v e l  o f  83.82, t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  s a v i n g s  w e r e  d i s t r i b u t e d  s o  
t h a t  A g o t  a  c o n s i d e r a b l y  l a r g e r  p o r t i o n ,  namely 1 .2 ,  w h i l e  t h e  
o t h e r s  s h a r e d  t h e  remain ing  2 .8  i n  e q u a l  p o r t i o n s  of  0.56.  T h i s  
i m p l i e d  a  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  t h e  83.82 a s  f o l l o w s : -  A: 20.65; 
H:  10.84;  L: 4.67; L: 9.65;  M: 18.42 and T: 19.59. T h i s  
g rand  c o a l i t i o n  a l s o  remained t o  come i n t o  f o r c e .  
COMPARISONS W I T H  METEODS AND EARLIER G-9MES 
W e  sum up t h e  comparison between t h e  outcome o f  t h e  p r e s e n t  
t h r e e  e x p e r i m e n t s ,  t h e  f o u r  e a r l i e r  exper iments  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  
d i s c u s s e d  s i x  methods i n  t a b l e  4 .  
Table 4: Summary of outcomes of experiments and methods 
GAME A H K L M T 
I 
SWEDISH GAME 21.15  9 .70  6 .00  9 .10  18 .37  19 .50  N A 
I 
ITALIAN GAME 20.81 9.55 6 .10  18 .72  18 .75  8 .88  
STUDENT GAME A 18.15  1 2 . 7 7  8 .10  13 .25  12 .90  18 .65  
STUDENT GAME B 18 .56  13.79 6 .75  8.00 17 .66  19 .05  
SHAPLEY VALUE 2 0 . 0 1  10 .71  6 .61  10 .37  16 .94  19 .18  
ORDINARY NUCLEOLUS 20.35  12 .06  5 .00  8.61 18 .32  19 .49  
PROPORTIONAL NUCLEOLUS 20.36 12 .46  3.52 8.67 18 .82  19 .99  
WEAK NUCLEOLUS 20.03  12 .52  3 .94  9.07 18.54 1 9 . 7 1  
S.C.R.B. 19 .54  13.28 5.62 10 .90  16 .66  17 .82  
DEMAND PROPORTIONAL 1 3 . 3 3  16 .32  7 .43  7 . 0 0  29.04 10 .69  
In order to see how well the theoretical allocations fit 
these experimental values, we have used three measures of 
difference: 
I )  The sum of absolute differences. With T as the theoretical 
value and E as the experimental value the measure is: 
2) The sum of the squared differences, i.e., 
6 2 Z (Ti - Ei) 
i=l 
Compared to measure 1 ,  this gives a higher relative 
weight to large discrepancies. 
3) The sum of the relative squared differences, i.e., of 
the squared differences after dividing each difference 
by the theoretical value, i.e. 
The idea behind this measure is that a difference is 
more important if it is relatively large in comparison 
with the "expected" value. 
As an additional method of forecasting the outcome of each 
game we also included the result of the original game played in 
Skane with Swedish water planners. We then obtained the results 
presented in tables 5, 6 and 7 below. 
From these tables we see: 
1. The outcome of the Swedish game, i.e., with the water 
planners in Skane, is by far the best predictor. (Best in 
two games, second in one game.) 
2. The allocation according topopulation was the worst and the 
one according to demand the second worse in all three games 
by large margins. This is a conclusion which also holds 
for all other games played. 
3. The SCRB was placed third from the bottom in everyone of 
the three games. The SCRB fared better in earlier games. 
4. The difference in the outcome of the four game theoretic 
method is not very great. The Shapley Value is, however, 
the best predictor as it was best in two games. Although 
it did not rank so well in the third game the Shapley Value 
still led to very low difference values. As regards the 
three Core methods, the Ordinary Nucleolus, which in this 
game violates monotonicity, fared better than the Weak 
Nucleolus and the Proportional Nucleolus, which do not 
violate monotonicity. It is interesting to note that this 
T a b l e  5: G a m e  1 
d i f f e r e n c e  measu re  
1 2 3 
Swedish game 
S h a p l e y  Value  
O r d i n a r y  N u c l e o l u s  
Weak N u c l e o l u s  
P r o p o r t i o n a l  N u c l e o l u s  
SCRB 
Demand 
P o p u l a t i o n  
T a b l e  6 :  Game 2 
d i f f e r e n c e  measu re  
1 2 3 
Swedish game 
S h a p l e y  Va lue  
O r d i n a r y  N u c l e o l u s  
Weak N u c l e o l u s  
P r o p o r t i o n a l  N u c l e o l u s  
SCRB 
Demand 
P o p u l a t i o n  
T a b l e  7:  Game 3  
d i f f e r e n c e  measu re  
1  2  3  
1 .  O r d i n a r y  N u c l e o l u s  3.09 2 .79  0.28 
2.  Swedish game 3.66 3 .63  0.47 
3.  Weak N u c l e o l u s  3.85 4.10 0 .42  
4.  P r o p o r t i o n a l  N u c l e o l u s  4.84 5.31 0.72 
5.  S h a p l e y  Va lue  5.32 7 .07  0.78 
6.  SCRB 9.28 15 .88  1 .18  
7 .  Demand 35.73 256 .43  16.36 
8 .  P o p u l a t i o n  51.91 624.52 46.24 
happened  i n  s p i t e  o f  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  w e ,  i n  t h e s e  t h r e e  games,  
i n fo rmed  t h e  p l a y e r s  o f  t h e  m o n o t o n i c i t y  p r i n c i p l e :  i n  
games 1  and  2  by i n s t r u c t i n g  p l a y e r s  A a n d  K t o  a r g u e  o n  
t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  and  i n  game 3  b y  h a v i n g  t h e  
p a r t i e s  a g r e e  on  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  f o r  two - cost l e v e l s .  
5.  The r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  t h r e e  games a p p e a r  f rom t a b l e s  5 - 7  
t o  b e  f a i r l y  s i m i l z r .  A l though  no  c o n c l u s i o n s  c a n  b e  drawn 
o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  o n l y  t h r e e  games,  t h i s  i s  a f i r s t  i n d i c a t i o n  
t h a t  t h e  v a r i a t i o n  i n  t h e  e x p e r i m e n t a l  v a r i a b l e s  ( p r i z e  : 
s t r u c t u r e  and ways of f o c u s  o n  n o r m a t i v e  a s p e c t )  d i d  n o t  
p l a y  a  v e r y  s t r o n g  r o l e .  A more f o r m a l  way o f  l o o k i n g  a t  
t h e  p o s s i b l e  d i f f e r e n c e  d u e  t o  t h e  e x p e r i m e n t a l  d e s i g n  
would b e  t o  u s e  t h e  r e s u l t  i n  o n e  game a s  a p r e d i c t o r  o f  
t h e  outcome i n  a n o t h e r  game and  t h e n  compute t h e  above  
men t ioned  d i f f e r e n c e  m e a s u r e s .  I f  w e  u s e  t h e  r e s u l t  i n  
game 6  a s  a  p r e d i c t o r  o f  t h e  outcome i n  game 5 ,  w e  o b t a i n  
t h e  f o l l o w i n g  v a l u e s  o n  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  measu res :  
1:  4.74; 2: 7.91; 3: 0 . 4 2 ; ' .  I f  w e  u s e  t h e  r e s u l t  i n .  
game 7  as a  p r e d i c t o r o f t h e  outcome i n  game 6  w e  o b t a i n  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  measu res :  1 :  4 .16;  2: 4 .35;  3: 0.70.  Looking  
i n  t a b l e s  5  - 7,  w e  see t h a t  t h e s e  v a l u e s  are q u i t e  l o w ,  
r o u g h l y  e q u i v a l e n t  i n  s i z e  t o  t h o s e  o f  t h e  Swed i sh  game. 
' Using  game 5  a s  a  p r e d i c t o r  o f  t h e  outcome o f  game 6  g i v e s  
t h e  same v a l u e s  f o r  m e a s u r e s  1  and  2  and a s l i g h t l y  d i f f e r e n t  
v a l u e  ( 0 . 4 4 )  f o r  measure  3. 
These i n d i c a t i o n s  t h a t  t h e  changes  i n  e x p e r i m e n t a l  v a r i a b l e s  
d i d  n o t  m a t t e r  w e r e  s u p p o r t e d  by o b s e r v i n g  t h e  p l a y i n g  o f  t h e  game 
and by t a l k i n g  a f t e r w a r d s  w i t h  t h e  p l a y e r s .  A l though  t h e  amounts 
o f  money i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e  t h r e e  games h e r e  were h i g h e r  t h a n  i n  t h e  
Swedish and I t a l i a n  games1 ,  t h e  p r i z e  s t r u c t u r e  d i d  n o t  a p p e a r  t o  
have  i n f l u e n c e d  t h e  p l a y e r s .  
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  t h e  way t h e  p l a y e r s  i n  game 3  approached  t h e  
ag reemen t  on  two c o s t  l e v e l s  i n  no way gave  them s p e c i a l  r e a s o n s  
t o  f a v o r  t h e  Weak o r  P r o p o r t i o n a l  N u c l e o l i .  Al though t h e  
p a r t i e s  d i d  - n o t  v i o l a t e  t h e  m o n o t o n i c i t y  p r i n c i p l e  when g o i n g  
from one  c o s t  l e v e l  t o  t h e  o t h e r , t h i s  c o n s i s t e n c y  would have  had  
a n  e f f e c t  i n  t h e  d i s c u s s e d  r e g a r d  o n l y  i f  t h e  ag reemen t  r e g a r d i n g  
t h e  f i r s t  c o s t  l e v e l  had been e x a c t l y  on t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  t h e  
O r d i n a r y  N u c l e o l u s .  
~t f u r t h e r m o r e  a p p e a r e d  t h a t  t h e  c o n s u l t a n t ' s  r e p o r t  d i d  
n o t  a p p e a r  t o  m a t t e r  e i t h e r .  Each p l a y e r  r e a d  h i s  r e p o r t  b r i e f l y  
a t  t h e  s t a r t  o f  t h e  game b u t  d u r i n g  t h e  a c t u a l  n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  
a s  f a r  a s  w e  c o u l d  o b s e r v e ,  t h e  p l a y e r s  n e i t h e r  r e f e r e d  t o  o r  
r e r e a d  t h e s e   report^.^ 
THE CORE CONCEPT AND NORMATIVE THEORY 
An i n t e r e s t i n g  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  game, which  however c a n n o t  be  
s e e n  from t a b l e s  4 and 5 ,  i s  t h a t  i n  none o f  t h e  t h r e e  games d o e s  
t h e  ag reemen t  v i o l a t e  t h e  c o r e .  I n  games 1 a n d 3 t h e  s o l u t i o n  l i e s  
i n s i d e  t h e  c o r e ;  i n  game 2  it  l i e s  e x a c t l y  on t h e  boundary .  H ob- 
t a i n e d  9.85 and hence  A ,  K t  L , M a n d T t o g e t h e r  o b t a i n e d  83.82-9.85= 
7 3 . 9 7 .  A s  c a n  b e  s e e n  from t a b l e  1 t h e y  c o u l d  have  o b t a i n e d  t h i s  
j u s t  a s  w e l l  by f o r m i n g  t h e  f i v e  p a r t y  c o a l i t i o n  AKLMT. 
I n  t h i s  r e s p e c t  t h e  outcome o f  t h e s e  t h r e e  games d i f f e r s  
f rom t h e  f o u r  games p l a y e d  e a r l i e r .  The c o r e  w a s  v i o l a t e d  i n  
a l l  o f  t h e s e  f o u r  games. One c a n  wonder t o  what  e x t e n t  t h e  
p r e - i n f o r m a t i o n  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  c o r e  c o n c e p t  i n f l u e n c e d  t h e  
p a r t i e s  i n  t h e s e  t h r e e  games. 
Here, it i s  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  i n t e r e s t  t o  make a compar ison  w i t h  
t h e  Swedish and  I t a l i a n  games, s i n c e  t h e  r e s u l t s  i n  t h e s e  two 
games c o r r e s p o n d e d  c l o s e l y  t o  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  t h r e e  games 
1 Ten A u s t r i a n  s c h i l l i n g s  c o r r e s p o n d e d  i n  games 1 and 3  t o  
one  m i l l i o n  Swedish  crowns i n  t h e  o r i g i n a l  game, imp ly ing  
t h a t  a t o t a l  o f  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  AS250 were a t  s t a k e  i n  t h e s e  
games. I n  t h e  Swedish game 1 crown ( r o u g h l y  3  s c h i l l i n g s )  
c o r r e s p o n d e d  t o  one  m i l l i o n  c rowns .  I n  t h e  I t a l i a n  game 
t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  amount was o n l y  100 l i r e .  
2 I t  s h o u l d  b e  n o t e d  t h a t  i n  g r o u p  1 ,  i n v o l v i n g  a  game t h e o -  
r e t i c i a n  (see f o o t n o t e  2 ,  P .9)  knowing a l l  t h e  a rgumen t s  f o r  
t h e  P r o p o r t i o n a l  N u c l e o l u s ,  t h e  S h a p l e y  Value  was on t o p  
o f  t h e  game t h e o r e t i c a l  methods ,  w h i l e  t h e  P r o p o r t i o n a l  
N u c l e o l u s  f a r e d  worse .  
p r e s e n t e d  h e r e . '  I n  t h e  Swedish and I t a l i a n  games t h e  v i o l a t i o n  
o f  t h e  c o r e  c o n s i s t e d  i n  p a r t y  H pay ing  less t h a n  h i s  " i n d i v i d u a l  
marg ina l  cost" 9.85 (see t a b l e  4 ) .  A s  n o t e d  above,  i f  H pays l e s s  
t h a n  9.85 i n  t h e  g rand  coalition,AKLMT have r e a s o n s  t o  throw o u t  H 
and i n s t e a d  form a  f i v e  p e r s o n  c o a l i t i o n .  
While check ing  whe the r  a  p a r t i c u l a r  s o l u t i o n  i s  i n  t h e  core 
i n  g e n e r a l  i s  r a t h e r  cumbersome, checking t h a t  a  p a r t y  s h a l l  
pay h i s  ' ' individual  m a r g i n a l  c o s t "  i s  e a s y  t o  compute. I n  p a r t -  
i c u l a r ,  s i n c e  t h e  c o r e  i d e a  i n  t h e  i n t r o d u c t o r y  p r e s e n t a t i o n  
s t a r t e d  by p r e s e n t i n g  t h e  i d e a  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  m a r g i n a l  cost  
coverage ,  it i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  t h e  i n t r o d u c t o r y  l e c t u r e  c o u l d  
a c c o u n t f o r t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e s e  t h r e e  games on t h e  one 
hand and t h e  Swedish and I t a l i a n  games on t h e  o t h e r  hand a s  
r e g a r d s  t h e  v i o l a t i o n  o f  t h e  c o r e  p r i n c i p l e .  
I n  e a r l i e r  p a p e r s  w e  have n o t e d  t h a t  t h e  i d e a  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  
r a t i o n a l i t y  i s  a  power fu l  o n e . 2  even from a  p r e d i c t i v e  p o i n t  o f  
view. I t  a p p e a r s  a f t e r  t h e s e  t h r e e  gaming e x p e r i m e n t s  r e a s o n a b l e  
t o  r e g a r d  t h e  i d e a  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  m a r g i n a l  cost  coverage  a s  a  
powerful  i d e a  from t h e  normat ive  p o i n t  o f  v iew,  i n  t h e  s e n s e  t h a t  
one  can  e a s i l y  i n f l u e n c e  p l a y e r s  t o  behave a c c o r d i n g l y .  
On t h e  b a s i s  o f  o u r  e x p e r i e n c e  from t h e s e  games w e  would 
l i k e  t o  s u g g e s t  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  h y p o t h e s i s .  I t  w i l l  be e a s i e r  t o  
g e t  p l a y e r s  t o  f o l l o w  t h e  i d e a s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  m a r g i n a l  c o s t  
coverage  t h a n  t h e  more g e n e r a l  i d e a  o f  m a r g i n a l  cost  coverage  
ex tended  t o  groups  o f  u s e r s  (which i n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  the '  f u l l  
c o s t  p r i n c i p l e  is  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  t h e  i d e a  o f  g roup  r a t i o n a l i t y ) .  
F u r t h e r  exper iments  would, however, be  r e q u i r e d  f o r  t h e  c o n f i r -  
mat ion  o f  t h i s  h y p o t h e s i s .  
I n  l i n e  w i t h  t h i s  h y p o t h e s i s  w e  would f i n a l l y  l i k e  t o  s u g g e s t  
t h e  f o l l o w i n g  v e r y  s i m p l e  a i d  f o r  c o s t  a l l o c a t i o n  s i t u a t i o n s  o f  
t h i s  t y p e ,  namely t o  s u p p l y  a l l  p a r t i e s  w i t h  i n f o r m a t i o n  r e g a r d -  
i n g  what shou ld  be t h e i r  h i g h e s t  r e s p e c t i v e l y  l o w e s t  payments on t h e  
b a s i s  o f  t h e  i d e a s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  r a t i o n a l i t y  and i n d i v i d u a l  m a r g i n a l  
cost  coverage .  
For  t h i s  game a  t a b l e  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  t y p e  i s  s u g g e s t e d :  
A s  r e g a r d s  t h e  Swedish game t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  measures a r e  shown 
i n  t a b l e s  5  - 7.  The a v e r a g e  d i f f e r e n c e  measure v a l u e s  f o r  t h e  
I t a l i a n  game, when used a s  p r e d i c t i n g  method f o r  t h e  t h r e e  
games, a r e  3.45; 3.81; 0.33 r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  t h a t  i s  q u i t e  l o w .  
The c o r r e s p o n d i n g  measures  f o r  t h e  games w i t h  Swedish D o c t o r a l  
S t u d e n t s  a r e  17.17;  64.56;  5.12 and 8.67; 20.20; 1.58,  i . e . ,  
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  h i g h e r .  
See WP-80-134, p.12 
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8 3 . 8 2  - 6 6 . 4 6  = 17 .36  
83 .82  -73 .97  = 9 .85  
83 .82  - 8 3 . 0 0  = 0.82  
83 .82  -77 .42  = 6.40  
8 3 . 8 2  - 7 0 . 9 3  = 1 2 . 8 9  
8 3 . 8 2  -69 .76  = 1 4 . 0 6  
21 .95  
1 7 . 0 8  
10 .91  
15 .88  
20 .81  
2 1 . 9 8  
APPENDIX A: GAME INSTRUCTIOIqS 
You have been i n v i t e d  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  a  s i m p l e  game. The 
game concerns  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  of  c o s t s  i n  a  w a t e r  p r o j e c t .  T h i s  
p r o j e c t  aims a t  b r i n g i n g  w a t e r  t o  s i x  m u n i c i p a l i t i e s .  You w i l l  
r e p r e s e n t  o n e  o f  t h e s e .  On t h i s  o c c a s i o n ,  a s  t h e  sole 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  t h i s  m u n i c i p a l i t y ,  you w i l l  r e p r e s e n t  b o t h  t h e  
p roducer  and t h e  consumer s i d e .  
YOU w i l l  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  t h i s  p r o j e c t  e i t h e r  comple te ly  on 
your  own, o r  i n  c o o p e r a t i o n  w i t h  one  o r  s e v e r a l  o f  t h e  o t h e r  
p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  t h e  game, who a r e  a c t i n g  a s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  f o r  
o t h e r  m u n i c i p a l i t i e s .  
~ l l  i n  a l l ,  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  s i x  m u n i c i p a l i t i e s ,  c a l l e d  
A ,  H ,  K t  L ,  M ,  and T ,  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  t h e  game. A l l  p a r t i c i p a n t s  
(= m u n i c i p a l i t i e s )  must  i n  some way t a k e  p a r t  i n  t h e  w a t e r  
p r o j e c t ,  b u t  t h e i r  c o s t s  w i l l  depend on how t h e y  form c o a l i t i o n s  
w i t h  o t h e r  p a r t i c i p a n t s .  
s h o u l d  a  m u n i c i p a l i t y  n o t  e n t e r  i n t o  a  c o a l i t i o n  w i t h  any 
o t h e r  m u n i c i p a l i t y ,  it w i l l  pay t h a t  sum i n  T a b l e  1 which 
r e p r e s e n t s  what  e a c h  m u n i c i p a l i t y  would b e  o b l i g a t e d  t o  pay i f  
a c t i n g  a l o n e .  
Each p l a y e r  c a n ,  however, by a c t i n g  s k i l l f u l l y  b o t h  d u r i n g  
t h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  c o a l i t i o n s  and d u r i n g  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  of t h e  
t o t a l  c o s t s  w i t h i n  t h e  c o a l i t i o n ,  g e t  away w i t h  a  lower  payment, 
i n  some cases, a c o n s i d e r a b l y  lower  one.  
The d e t a i l s  of t h e  game a r e  a s  f o l l o w s :  By l o t t e r y ,  each  
p l a y e r  i s  a s s i g n e d  t h e  r o l e  of t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of  one  of t h e  
s i x  m u n i c i p a l i t i e s .  
1 , 3  [ N e x t ,  e a c h  p l a y e r  o b t a i n s  ( i n  t h e  form o f  an  I O U )  t h e  
a f o r e m e n t i o n e d  sum o f  money c o r r e s p o n d i n g  t o  t h e  maximum amount 
t h a t  h e  m i g h t  have  t o  pay ,  s h o u l d  h e  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  t h e  w a t e r  
p r o j e c t  c o m p l e t e l y  on h i s  own2 
A f t e r  t h i s ,  t h e  p l a y e r s  s i t  down a r o u n d  t h e  t a b l e  a n d  
t h e  c o a l i t i o n - f o r m a t i o n  n e g o t i a t i o n s  c a n  b e g i n .  
The p l a y e r s  t h e n  mus t  t r y  t o  form c o a l i t i o n s  and  r e a c h  
ag reemen t  on  how much e a c h  o f  t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  t h e  formed 
c o a l i t i o n  s h a l l  pay  o f  t h e  t o t a l  c o s t  t o  t h e  whole  c o a l i t i o n .  
T h i s  t o t a l  cost o f  e a c h  p o s s i b l e  c o a l i t i o n  i s  s e e n  i n  t h e  
a t t a c h e d  t a b l e .  ( T a b l e  1 ) .  
[ A s  n o t e d  i n  T a b l e  1 ,  t h e  c o s t  o f  t h e  g r a n d  c o a l i t i o n  AHKLMT, 
w i l l  e i t h e r  b e  838.2 o r  878.2 depend ing  on w h e t h e r  t h e  
government  w i l l  g i v e  a  s p e c i a l  s u b s i d y  of  4 0  f o r  t h e  p l a n t  o f  
t h i s  c o a l i t i o n .  No government  s u b s i d y  w i l l  b e  g i v e n  t o  a n y  
c o a l i t i o n  o t h e r  t h a n  t h e  g r a n d  c o a l i t i o n  AHKLMT. Whether  t h e  
s u b s i d y  r e a l l y  w i l l  b e  p a i d  o r  n o t  w i l l  n o t  b e  d e t e r m i n e d  u n t i l  
a f t e r  t h e  game i s  f i n i s h e d ,  w i t h  e i t h e r  e v e n t  b e i n g  e q u a l l y  
l i k e l y .  T h e r e f o r e ,  e v e r y  g r a n d  c o a l i t i o n  mus t  r e g i s t e r  two pay- 
ment d i s t r i b u t i o n s ,  o n e  f o r  t h e  c a s e  when c o s t s  a r e  878.2 and  
t h e  o t h e r  f o r  t h e  c a s e  when c o s t s  a r e  838.2. j  
AS soon  a s  t h e  f i r s t  c o a l i t i o n  h a s  been formed and  ag reemen t  
h a s  been  r e a c h e d  a s  t o  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  t h e  t o t a l  c o s t s  o f  t h i s  
c o a l i t i o n  among i t s  members, t h e y  r e g i s t e r  t h e  c o a l i t i o n  w i t h  
t h e  game d i r e c t o r .  H e  w i l l  t h e n  r e c o r d  t h e  names o f  t h e  c o a l i -  
t i o n  p a r t i c i p a n t s ,  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  payment e a c h  o f  them would 
make toward  t h e  t o t a l  c o s t s  o f  t h e  c o a l i t i o n .  Once a  c o a l i t i o n  
h a s  been  r e g i s t e r e d ,  i t s  c o n t e n t ,  i . e . ,  t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  and  
t h e  cost a l l o c a t i o n ,  i s  announced t o  a l l  p a r t i c i p a n t s  o f  t h e  
game. 
A c o a l i t i o n  d o e s  n o t  come i n t o  f o r c e ,  however ,  u n t i l  1 5  
m i n u t e s  have  e l a p s e d  s i n c e  i t s  r e g i s t r a t i o n ,  and  t h e n  o n l y  
p r o v i d e d  t h a t  none  o f  i t s  members h a s  been  r e g i s t e r e d  i n  a n o t h e r  
c o a l i t i o n  d u r i n g  t h i s  p e r i o d .  Hence a  p l a y e r  c a n  l e a v e  o n e  
c o a l i t i o n  and  j o i n  a n o t h e r  i n  o r d e r  t o  d e c r e a s e  t h e  amount o f  
h i s  payment.  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  a  c o a l i t i o n  d i s s o l v e s  by  r e g i s t e r i n g  
a  new c o a l i t i o n  w i t h  a d d i t i o n a l  members. F o r  new c o a l i t i o n s ,  
t h e  r u l e  s t i l l  a p p l i e s  t h a t  it d o e s  n o t  come i n t o  f o r c e  u n t i l  
it h a s  been  r e g i s t e r e d  unchanged f o r  1 5  m i n u t e s .  
~ f  t h e  p l a y e r s  o f  a  c o a l i t i o n  b e f o r e  t h e s e  1 5  m i n u t e s  have  
e l a p s e d  s t i l l  want  t o  r e m a i n  i n  t h e  game, t h e y  c a n  d o  s o  by o n c e  
more r e g i s t e r i n g  t h e  same c o a l i t i o n  as p r e v i o u s l y .  The p l a y e r s  
w i l l  t h e n  r ema in  i n  t h e  game f o r  a t  leas t  a n o t h e r  15 m i n u t e s .  
Once a c o a l i t i o n  h a s  come i n t o  f o r c e ,  e a c h  o f  i t s  members 
c o n f i r m s  w i t h  t h e  game l e a d e r  t h a t  h i s  m u n i c i p a l i t y  i s  w i l l i n g  
t o  pay t h e  amount a g r e e d  upon a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  t h e  r e g i s t r a t i o n .  
T h e s e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  t h e n  cease t o  t a k e  a n  a c t i v e  p a r t  i n  t h e  game, 
b u t  may r ema in  a t  t h e  t a b l e  i f  t h e y  w i s h  t o  d o  s o .  
The game c o n t i n u e s  i n  t h i s  way u n t i l  a l l  p a r t i c i p a n t s  a r e  
members of  a  c o a l i t i o n  which h a s  come i n t o  f o r c e  ( w i t h  t h e  p o s s i -  
b l e  e x c e p t i o n  o f  a  s i n g l e  " l e f t o v e r "  p a r t i c i p a n t ) .  Should t h e  
game c o n t i n u e  more t h a n  90  m i n u t e s  from t h e  t i m e  o f  i t s  s t a r t ,  
it w i l l  b e  b r o u g h t  t o  a n  end and t h o s e  c o a l i t i o n s  r e g i s t e r e d  
( b u t  n o t  b roken)  a t  t h e  t i m e  w i l l  come i n t o  f o r c e .  
[ ~ t  t h e  end of  t h e  game, each  p l a y e r  pays  t h e  game l e a d e r  
t h e  amount h e  i s  r e g i s t e r e d  f o r ,  or  i f  he  is  n o t  a  member o f  
any c o a l i t i o n ,  h i s  c o s t s  when go ing  a l o n e .  H e  can t h e n  u s e  h i s  
i n i t i a l l y  o b t a i n e d  I O U  and can t h e n  keep t h e  s u r p l u s . 1  
[A money p r i z e  w i l l  be g i v e n  t o  t h a t  p l a y e r  who a c c o r d i n g  t o  
t h e  judgement o f  t h e  game l e a d e r  a c t s  a s  t h e  most s k i l l f u l  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  f o r  h i s  municipality among t h e  s i x  p l a y e r s  t a k i n g  
p a r t  i n  t h e  game.] 
F i n a l l y ,  it s h o u l d  b e  s t r e s s e d  t h a t  t h e  aim of  t h e  game i s  
t o  shed l i g h t  on how m u n i c i p a l i t i e s  n e g o t i a t e  i n  t h e  f i e l d  of  
w a t e r  r e s o u r c e s  and what would be  r e a s o n a b l e  c o s t  a l l o c a t i o n  
models i n  t h i s  a r e a .  Hence it i s  i m p o r t a n t  t h a t  you t r y  a s  much 
a s  p o s s i b l e  t o  a c t  a s  one  cou ld  e x p e c t  a  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  f o r  a  
m u n i c i p a l i t y  t o  a c t  d u r i n g  such n e g o t i a t i o n s  where t h e  economic 
i n t e r e s t  of  t h e  m u n i c i p a l i t y  a r e  a t  s t a k e .  
You have a l s o  been s u p p l i e d  by a  c o n s u l t a n t  w i t h  i n f o r m a t i o n  
r e g a r d i n g  a  method t h a t  he  b e l i e v e s  t h a t  you shou ld  a r g u e  f o r .  
YOU a r e  q u i t e  f r e e  t o  u s e  or d i s r e g a r d  t h e  arguments .  I t  s h o u l d  
b e  mentioned t h a t  t h e  o t h e r  p l a y e r s  have r e c e i v e d  s i m i l a r  informa- 
t i o n  c o n c e r n i n g  o t h e r  methods. 
T a b l e  1 .  T o t a l  C o s t  
s h i l l i n g s )  . 
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APPENDIX B: 
INFORMATION FOR PLAYER A 
AS seen  from T a b l e  2 on a l l o c a t i o n s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  d i f f e r e n t  
methods, t h e  Weak Nuc leo lus  a p p e a r s  t o  b e  t h e  one  most f a v o r a b l e  
t o  you ( t h e  Shapley  v a l u e  g i v e s  you s l i g h t l y  s m a l l e r  c o s t s  b u t  
t h i s  might  n o t  have much chance  s i n c e  it d o e s  n o t  l i e  i n  t h e  
c o r e ;  see be low) .  
The main i d e a  beh ind  t h e  Weak Nuc leo lus  i s  a s  f o l l o w s :  
F i r s t  o f  a l l ,  it l i e s  w i t h i n  t h e  Core. The Core  i s  based  on t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  t h r e e  p r i n c i p l e s :  
1 ) I n d i v i d u a l  R a t i o n a l i t y :  
NO m u n i c i p a l i t y  s h a l l  pay a  h i g h e r  c o s t  t h a n  it would 
have  t o  pay,  i f  it were t o  f u l f i l l  i t s  w a t e r  needs  
comple te ly  on i t s  own. 
2) The " F u l l  Cos t "  P r i n c i p l e :  
T o t a l  c o s t s  s h o u l d  be covered ,  l e a v i n g  no s u r p l u s  and 
no l o s s  t o  any t h i r d  p a r t y .  
3 )  "Group R a t i o n a l i t y " ,  implying t h a t  t h e  sum o f  payments 
made by t h e  members of e v e r y  c o a l i t i o n  which i s  smaller 
t h a n  t h e  g rand  c o a l i t i o n ,  s h o u l d  n o t  b e  l a r g e r  t h a n  t h e  
c o s t  t h a t  t h i s  c o a l i t i o n  i n c u r s  i f  it i s  working on i t s  
own. 
Demand p r o p o r t i o n a l  a l l o c a t i o n s  v i o l a t e  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  of  
i n d i v i d u a l  r a t i o n a l i t y ,  e . g . ,  f o r  M ,  who on h i s  own can  g e t  
away w i t h  paying 20.81. 
The SCRB and t h e  Shapley  v a l u e  v i o l a t e  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  of  
g roup  r a t i o n a l i t y .  According t o  t h e  SCRB p r o c e d u r e ,  HKL s h a l l  
t o g e t h e r  pay 29.80 and a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  Shapley  v a l u e  27.69. 
Should t h e y  n o t  j o i n  t h e  g rand  c o a l i t i o n ,  b u t  remain s a t i s f i e d  
w i t h  t h e  t h r e e - p a r t y  c o a l i t i o n  HKL, t h e y  would o n l y  have  t o  pay 
t h e  c o s t  o f  t h i s  c o a l i t i o n ,  27.26. 
T h e r e  a r e ,  however, a  g r e a t  many s o l u t i o n s  i n  t h e  c o r e .  One 
way t o  o b t a i n  a  un ique  s o l u t i o n  i n  t h e  c o r e  i s  t o  assume t h a t  
one  g i v e s  s u b s i d i e s  t o  t h e  v a r i o u s  s u b c o a l i t i o n s  s o  t h a t  one 
o b t a i n s  a  un ique  c o r e .  
One s imple  sys tem o f  such  s u b s i d i e s  i s  t h e  Weak Nucleolus .  
Then e a c h  p l a y e r  o b t a i n s  t h e  same s u b s i d y  i n  e v e r y  c o a l i t i o n .  
The Weak Nuc leo lus  i s  b e t t e r  t h a n  t h e  Ord ina ry  Nuc leo lus  
s i n c e  t h e  Ord ina ry  Nuc leo lus  d o e s  n o t  obey t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
p r i n c i p l e :  1f costs g o  up, no o n e s h a l l  pay less; i f  c o s t s  g o  
down, no one s h a l l  pay more. 
INFORMATION FOR PLAYER H 
AS s e e n  from T a b l e  2  o n  a l l o c a t i o n s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  d i f f e r e n t  
me thods ,  t h e  S h a p l e y  v a l u e  i s  t h e  o n e  g i v i n g  you t h e  l o w e s t  c o s t s .  
The main i d e a  b e h i n d  t h i s  v a l u e  i s  a s  f o l l o w s :  
The g r a n d  c o a l i t i o n  i s  formed s t e p  by s t e p ;  f i r s t  o n e  p a r t y  
j o i n s  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  a n o t h e r  p a r t  t o  form a  t h r e e - p a r t y  c o a l i t i o n ,  
and t h e n  a n o t h e r  p a r t y  is  added  t o  form a  f o u r - p a r t y  c o a l i t i o n ,  
e t c . ,  u n t i l  f i n a l l y  t h e  g r a n d  c o a l i t i o n  i s  formed.  T h e r e  a r e  
i n  t h i s  6 p l a y e r  game, 720 ways o r  o r d e r s  i n  which  s u c h  a pro-  
c e d u r e  c a n  t a k e  p l a c e ,  depend ing  o n  which p a r t y  " s i g n s  up" f i r s t ,  
and  which p a r t y  " s i g n s  up" n e x t .  F o r  e a c h  o r d e r ,  a  p a r t y  j o i n i n g  
a  c o a l i t i o n  i s  t h o u g h t  o n l y  t o  pay  t h e  i n c r e m e n t a l  c o s t s  ( i . e . ,  
t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  be tween  t h e  c o s t  o f  t h e  new c o a l i t i o n  and  t h e  
c o s t  o f  t h e  o n e  h e  j o i n s ) .  The Shap ley  v a l u e  f o r  e a c h  p a r t y  
i s  t h e n  t h e  p a r t y ' s  a v e r a g e  payments ,  computed o v e r  a l l  720 
c o a l i t i o n  f o r m a t i o n  o r d e r s .  
The S h a p l e y  v a l u e  i n  t h e  t a b l e  h a s  b e e n  computed by  a  
computer  program a l o n g  t h i s  l i n e  o f  r e a s o n i n g .  
INFORMATION FOR PLAYER K 
AS seen from Table  2 on a l l o c a t i o n s  accord ing  t o  d i f f e r e n t  
methods, t h e  P ropor t iona l  Nucleolus i s  t h e  one g iv ing  you t h e  
lowest  c o s t s .  
The main i d e a  behind t h e  P ropor t iona l  Nucleolus i s  a s  fo l lows:  
F i r s t  of a l l ,  it l i e s  w i t h i n  t h e  Core. The Core is  based on t h e  
fo l lowing  t h r e e  p r i n c i p l e s :  
1) I n d i v i d u a l  R a t i o n a l i t y :  
No muncipa l i ty  s h a l l  pay a  h ighe r  c o s t  than  it would 
have t o  pay, i f  it w e r e  t o  f u l f i l l  i t s  water  needs 
complete ly  on i t s  own. 
2) The " F u l l  Cost" P r i n c i p l e :  
T o t a l  c o s t s  should be covered,  l eav ing  no s u r p l u s  and 
no l o s s  t o  any t h i r d  pa r ty .  
3 )  "Group R a t i o n a l i t y " ,  implying t h a t  t h e  sum of payments 
made by t h e  members o f . e v e r y  c o a l i t i o n  which is smaller 
t han  t h e  grand c o a l i t i o n ,  should n o t  be  l a r g e r  than t h e  
c o s t  t h a t  t h i s  c o a l i t i o n  i n c u r s  i f  it i s  working on i t s  
own. 
Demand p r o p o r t i o n a l  a l l o c a t i o n s  v i o l a t e  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  of 
i n d i v i d u a l  r a t i o n a l i t y ,  e . g . ,  f o r  M ,  who on h i s  own can g e t  
away with  paying 20.81. 
The SCRB and t h e  Shapley va lue  v i o l a t e  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  of 
groug r a t i o n a l i t y .  According t o  t h e  SCRB procedure  HKL s h a l l  
t o g e t h e r  pay 29.80 and according t o  t h e  Shapley v a l u e  27.69. 
Should they  no t  j o i n  t h e  grand c o a l i t i o n ,  bu t  remain s a t i s f i e d  
wi th  t h e  t h ree -pa r ty  c o a l i t i o n  HKL, they  would on ly  have t o  pay 
t h e  c o s t  of t h i s  c o a l i t i o n ,  27.26. 
There a r e ,  however, a  g r e a t  many s o l u t i o n s  i n  t h e  core .  One 
way t o  o b t a i n  a  unique s o l u t i o n  i n  t h e  c o r e  i s  t o  assume t h a t  
one g i v e s  s u b s i d i e s  t o  t h e  v a r i o u s  s u b c o a l i t i o n s  s o  t h a t  one 
o b t a i n s  a  unique co re .  
One system of such s u b s i d i e s  i s  t h e  P r o p o r t i o n a l  Nucleolus.  
Then each s u b c o a l i t i o n  o b t a i n s  a  subs idy  t h a t  i s  p r o p o r t i o n a l  t o  
i t s  c o s t s .  
The P r o p o r t i o n a l  Nucleolus i s  b e t t e r  than  t h e  Ordinary 
Nucleolus s i n c e  t h e  Ordinary Nucleolus does  n o t  obey t h e  fo l lowing  
p r i n c i p l e :  I f  c o s t s  go up, no one s h a l l  p a y l e s s ;  i f  c o s t s  go 
down, no one s h a l l  pay more. 
The P ropor t iona l  Nucleolus a l s o  is  b e t t e r  than  t h e  Weak 
Nucleolus,  s i n c e  t h e  Weak Nucleolus does  n o t  obey t h e  fol lowing 
p r i n c i p l e :  A p l a y e r  who never  c o n t r i b u t e s  t o  an c o s t  s av in  s 
- 
any c o s t  sav ings  above h i s  go a lone  c o s t s .  
K P when jo in ing  wl th  o t h e r  p a r t i e s  o r  c o a l i t i o n s ,  s a l l  n o t  r e a  i z e  
INFORMATION FOR PLAYER L 
A s  s e e n  f rom T a b l e  2  on  a l l o c a t i o n s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  d i f f e r e n t  
methods ,  t h e  O r d i n a r y  N u c l e o l u s  is t h e  o n e  g i v i n g  you t h e  l o w e s t  
c o s t s  ( b e s i d e s  t h e  Demand P r o p o r t i o n a l  a l l o c a t i o n  method b u t  
t h i s  m i g h t  n o t  have  much chance  s i n c e  it d o e s  n o t  l i e  i n  t h e  
c o r e ;  s e e  b e l o w ) .  
The main i d e a  b e h i n d  t h e  O r d i n a r y  N u c l e o l u s  i s  a s  f o l l o w s :  
F i r s t  o f  a l l ,  it l i e s  w i t h i n  t h e  Core .  The Core  i s  b a s e d  on  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  t h r e e  p r i n c i p l e s :  
1  ) ~ n d i v i d u a l  R a t i o n a l i t y :  
No m u n i c i p a l i t y  s h a l l  pay a  h i g h e r  c o s t  t h a n  it would 
have  t o  pay ,  i f  it w e r e  t o  f u l f i l l  i t s  water n e e d s  
c o m p l e t e l y  o n  i t s  own. 
2 )  The " F u l l  C o s t "  P r i n c i p l e :  
~ o t a l  c o s t s  s h o u l d  be  c o v e r e d ,  l e a v i n g  no s u r p l u s  and  
no  l o s s  t o  any  t h i r d  p a r t y .  
3 )  "Group R a t i o n a l i t y " ,  imp ly ing  t h a t  t h e  sum o f  payments 
made by  t h e  members o f  e v e r y  c o a l i t i o n  which i s  s m a l l e r  
t h a n  t h e  g r a n d  c o a l i t i o n ,  s h o u l d  n o t  b e  l a r g e r  t h a n  t h e  
c o s t  t h a t  t h i s  c o a l i t i o n  i n c u r s  i f  it i s  working  o n  i t s  
own. 
Demand p r o p o r t i o n a l  a l l o c a t i o n s  v i o l a t e  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  
i n d i v i d u a l  r a t i o n a l i t y ,  e . g . ,  f o r  M I  who on  h i s  own c a n  get  
away w i t h  p a y i n g  20.81. 
The SCRB and  t h e  S h a p l e y  Value  v i o l a t e  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  
g r o u p  r a t i o n a l i t y .  Accord ing  t o  t h e  SCRB p r o c e d u r e ,  H K L  s h a l l  
t o g e t h e r  pay 29.80 a n d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  S h a p l e y  Va lue  27.69.  
Shou ld  t h e y  n o t  j o i n  t h e  g r a n d  c o a l i t i o n ,  b u t  remain  s a t i s f i e d  
w i t h  t h e  t h r e e - p a r t y  c o a l i t i o n  H K L ,  t h e y  would o n l y  h a v e  t o  pay 
t h e  cost of  t h i s  c o a l i t i o n ,  27.26.  
T h e r e  a r e ,  however,  a  g r e a t  many s o l u t i o n s  i n  t h e  c o r e .  One 
way t o  o b t a i n  a u n i q u e  s o l u t i o n  i n  t h e  c o r e  i s  t o  assume t h a t  
one  g i v e s  s u b s i d i e s  t o  t h e  v a r i o u s  s u b c o a l i t i o n s  s o  t h a t  one  
o b t a i n s  a u n i q u e  c o r e .  
The b e s t  known s y s t e m  o f  s u c h  s u b s i d i e s  i s  t h e  O r d i n a r y  
N u c l e o l u s .  Then e a c h  s u b c o a l i t i o n  o b t a i n s  t h e  same s u b s i d y .  
INFORMATION FOR PLAYER M 
A s  s e e n  f rom T a b l e  2 on a l l o c a t i o n s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  d i f f e r e n t  
me thods ,  t h e  SCRB method i s  t h e  o n e  g i v i n g  you t h e  lowest costs. 
T h i s  method h a s  b e e n  d e v e l o p e d  s p e c i f i c a l l y  f o r  p r a c t i c a l  u s e  i n  
water r e s o u r c e s  p l a n n i n g .  
W e  d e f i n e  t h e  m a r g i n a l  cost  f o r  a p a r t y  as t h e  m a r g i n a l  cost  
o f  b e i n g  t h e  l a s t  t o  j o i n  t h e  g r a n d  c o a l i t i o n .  The i d e a  b e h i n d  
t h e  SCRB method i s  t h e n  t h a t  e a c h  p l a y e r  s h o u l d  f i r s t  o f  a l l  pay  
h i s  m a r g i n a l  cost .  Then c e r t a i n  u n a l l o c a t e d  costs would  r ema in .  
T h e s e  would  t h e n  b e  s h a r e d  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  r e m a i n i n g  b e n e f i t  
o f  e a c h  p l a y e r .  
The " r e m a i n i n g  b e n e f i t "  i s  d e f i n e d  as t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  be tween  
t h e  cost  i f  t h e  m u n i c i p a l i t y  g o e s  a l o n e  and  i t s  m a r g i n a l  costs. 
The payment made by a p a r t y  i s  t h e n  computed as t h e  m a r g i n a l  
cost  p l u s  i t s  s h a r e  o f  t h e  n o n - a l l o c a t e d  costs where  t h e  s h a r e  i s  
t h e  p a r t y ' s  s h a r e  o f  r e m a i n i n g  b e n e f i t s .  
F o r  example ,  y o u r  m a r g i n a l  c o s t  is t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  12 .89  
be tween  t h e  costs o f  AHKLMT = 83.82 a n d  t h e  cost o f  AHKLT = 70.93. 
The t o t a l  o f  t h e  m a r g i n a l  costs is  61.39 and  h e n c e ,  83.82 - 61.39 = 
24.43 r e m a i n  u n a l l o c a t e d .  
Your r e m a i n i n g  b e n e f i t  i s  20.81 - 12.89 = 7.92.  The t o t a l  
amount o f  r e m a i n i n g  b e n e f i t s  c a n  b e  computed t o  b e  47.23. Hence,  
y o u r  s h a r e  o f  t h e  r e m a i n i n g  b e n e f i t s  is (7 .92/47.23)  = 0.169. 
Hence,  you pay  12.89 + 0.169 x 22.43 = 16.66.  
INFORMATION FOR PLAYER T 
A s  s e e n  f ro m  T a b l e  2 o n  a l l o c a t i o n s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  d i f f e r e n t  
me thods ,  t h e  Demand P r o p o r t i o n a l  method i s  t h e  o n e  g i v i n g  you t h e  
l o w e s t  c o s t s .  
  his a l l o c a t i o n  method is  t h e  o n l y  o n e  i n  t h e  t a b l e  wh i ch  
r e f l e c t s  t h e  u s e r  s i d e .  A l l o c a t i o n s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  
w i l l  i m p l y  t h a t  t h e  c o s t  o f  water p e r  c u b i c  meter w i l l  b e  t h e  
same i n  a l l  m u n i c i p a l i t i e s .  I t  i s  h e n c e  t h e  o n l y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
t h a t  t a k e s  i n t o  a c c o u n t  some p r i n c i p l e  o f  e q u i t y  o n  t h e  consumer  
side. T h i s  c o u l d  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  t o  b e  a  f a c t o r  t h a t  s h o u l d  w e i g h  
more  h e a v i l y  t h a n  t h e  p u r e l y  " m u n i c i p a l  e g o i s t i c "  r e a s o n i n g  b e h i n d  
t h e  o t h e r  a l l o c a t i o n  p r i n c i p l e s .  
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